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The capital markets within the United States are among the larg-
est in the world. Today, the combined volume of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq
market system reaches approximately $4 trillion dollars annually.'
With the size of the U.S. markets has come an understandable pride in
the success of the American regulatory system.2 Possessing one of the
most complex and intricate of regimes, the regulatory system in the
United States, as administered and monitored by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), is often praised.3 Not surprisingly, per-
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1 See Gerald S. Backman and Stephen E. Kim, From Disclosure to Registration, 5 Bus. L.
TODAY 53, 54 (1996).
2 See William E. Decker, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17
FORDHAm ImrL. L.J. 10, 10 (1994) ("Our markets are very attractive; the capital is here."); see
also Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a 7Tme of Economic
Transformation, 17 FomHAm INT. L.J. 77, 85 (1994) ("[I]f you're scoring a touchdown every
time your team gets its hands on the ball, is that the time to radically change the rules of the
game?").
3 See Breeden, supra note 2, at 82 ("From the ruins of the Crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression we have managed to build arduously a system.., of extraordinary confidence in the
fundamental integrity of the U.S. market").
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haps, the United States has frequently attempted to extend the reach
of its regime. Through international negotiations, for example, the
United States has successfully exported portions of its insider trading
prohibitions - at least formally - to Japan and Switzerland in recent
years.4 More directly, the United States often applies its own domes-
tic laws extraterritorially to transactions in other countries, justifying
its actions as necessary to protect American investors and the integrity
of U.S. capital markets.
This Article calls into question the desirability of applying Ameri-
can securities laws extraterritorially. Certainly the goals of protecting
investors and ensuring capital market integrity are laudable. How-
ever, the use of extraterritoriality to accomplish these goals is both
unnecessary and ineffective. Extraterritoriality results in frequent
conflicts between the United States and other nations. Furthermore,
the application of extraterritoriality limits the ability of investors and
issuers to select the securities regime of their own choosing. As a re-
sult, countries applying extraterritorial rules are insulated from com-
petitive pressures to tailor rules toward the joint interests of investors
and issuers. Rather, countries so insulated may craft regulatory re-
gimes that satisfy the interests of either government bureaucrats or
special interest groups.5
This Article argues that investors and American capital markets
are served best through clear jurisdictional rules that strictly limit the
application of U.S. laws and provide unambiguous means for both in-
vestors and issuers to opt-out of the domestic regulatory system. Reg-
ulation S of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), which
governs exemptions for overseas transactions from Section 5 of the
Securities Act's registration requirements, accomplishes this goal in
part. The application of the antifraud rules, however, remains extra-
territorial in nature. The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets
forth the extraterritorial elements in the current securities regulatory
regime. Part III analyzes and critiques the conventional justifications
for extraterritoriality, arguing that in fact most of these justifications
support greater investor and issuer mobility. Part III discusses the
proper role for extraterritoriality and offers some alternatives to ex-
traterritoriality. The Article then concludes in Part IV.
4 See generally B. Rider, D. Chaikin & C. Abrams, Guide to the Financial Services Act 704-
718 (1986); see also Patrick F. Wallace, Who is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading:
A Comparative Study of American, British and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. Rav. 217 (1985).
5 See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Forma-
tion: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARnozo L. REv. 909, 914 (1994) (describing the
incentive of agencies to engage in overregulation).
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II. ExTRATERRoRIALTY AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Transactions which may raise extraterritorial concerns from the
perspective of the U.S. securities regime occur in a number of differ-
ent contexts. This Article focuses on two of the more important areas:
(A) the issuance of securities and (B) the application of antifraud
rules.
6
A. The Reach of the Securities Act
Section 5 forms the lynch-pin of the Securities Act, covering all
offers and sales of securities. Under Section 5, an issuer must file a
registration statement containing numerous information disclosure
items relating to the issuer and the securities transaction and must
distribute a prospectus, under certain circumstances,7 containing a
portion of this information to investors before sales are allowed.8
Most non-issuer sales of securities, however, are exempt from Section
5 under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act.9 As a result, the primary
impact of the Securities Act is to regulate the sale of securities by
issuers, 10 for whom the Securities Act has a broad reach. By its terms,
Section 5 covers all offers and sales of securities that makes use of
"any means or instruments of transportation or communication in in-
terstate commerce."" The definition of interstate commerce, pro-
vided in Section 2(7) of the Securities Act,12 includes transportation or
communication "between any foreign country and any State, Terri-
tory, or the District of Columbia."' 3 Taken literally, this provision ex-
tends U.S. jurisdiction over all offerings, anywhere in the world, that
have some connection with the United States, no matter how remote.
6 Rule 15a-6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") covers the exten-
sion of broker-dealer registration requirements to foreign brokers and dealers. 17 C.F.R.
240.15a-6 (1994). The extraterritoriality of Rule 15a-6's application is beyond the scope of this
Article.
7 For example, under the Securities Act, a section 10(a) prospectus must accompany or
precede any additional written materials sent to potential investors after the effective date of the
registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1994).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). Section 5 contains numerous other requirements relating to
the registration process and the delivery of the prospectus to investors.
9 Section 4(1) exempts all "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer" from the registration requirements of Section 5. See Section 4(1), Securities Act.
10 Because anyone selling for a control person is considered an underwriter under Section
2(11) of the Securities Act, control persons generally are prohibited from using Section 4(1)'s
exemption from Section 5. See Section 2(11), Securities Act. As a result, control persons must
find some other exemption to Section 5 or else have their securities registered by the issuer.
11 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
12 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1994).
13 Id
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For example, transactions that make use of telephone calls into the
United States either in the course of selling the securities or in prepa-
ration for the sale may fall under Section 5's jurisdiction.
Despite the expansive coverage the Securities Act takes on its
face, the SEC has not sought to push the jurisdictional limits of Sec-
tion 5, choosing instead to adopt a more restrained approach through
Regulation S.14 Enacted after a period of confusion and uncertainty
that ran from 1964 to 1990,15 Regulation S provides guidance on
which securities transactions conducted outside the United States may
come under the reach of Section 5. Rules 901 through 904 of the Se-
curities Act form the body of Regulation S and take a primarily terri-
torial approach to jurisdiction. Issues made "outside" the United
States are exempt under Rule 901 from the registration requirements
of Section 5.16 In particular, Regulation S establishes two safe harbors
from Section 5: one for issuers 7 under Rule 903 and one for resales
under Rule 904.18 An offer or sale that satisfies either Rule 903 or 904
is deemed to occur "outside" the United States for the purposes of
Rule 901 and is, therefore, exempt from Section 5.19
For any section in Regulation S to apply, parties must meet two
basic requirements. We briefly outline these basic requirements be-
14 See Regulation S Rules 901-904. 17 C.F.R. 230.901-904 (1994).
15 This confusion was caused by Securities Act Release No. 4708 (Release 4708) which at-
tempted to limit the reach of United States law by exempting from the registration requirements
of Section 5 offerings that were sold in a manner reasonably designed to preclude distribution or
redistribution in the United States or to nationals of the United States. Registration of Foreign
Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33,4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1361 (July 9, 1964). In the wake of Release 4708 came a large number of SEC no-action letters
which failed to give shape to the policy. "[M]ost companies were compelled to seek an individu-
alized determination of the Commission's staff that their particular offerings would not be
deemed to occur in the United States." Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities
Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 939 (1994). One of the consequences
of the law prior to Regulation S was that U.S. investors found it difficult to invest in issues made
by foreign issuers (which were not discussed in Release 4708, and whose status was uncertain).
These foreign issuers feared that the presence of a U.S. investor would trigger a registration
requirement in the United States. Id. at 941.
16 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.901 (1994).
17 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.903 (1994).
18 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.904 (1994).
19 Foreign issuers, in particular, care about escaping the financial information disclosure
items of Section 5's registration statement that relate to accounting disclosures pursuant to the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). See, eg., Nicholas G. Demmo, U.S. Securi-
ties Regulation: The Need for Modification to Keep Pace with Globalization, 17 U. PA. J. Iwr'L
EcoN. L. 691, 693 (1996).
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low. We then discuss the specific requirements of the issuer safe har-
bor under Rule 903.20
1. General Requirements of Regulations
The application of Regulation S turns on whether a transaction is
deemed to occur outside the United States.2" Regulation S has two
basic requirements which ensure that exempted transactions take
place territorially outside the United States. First, a transaction is
deemed to occur outside the United States only if "an offer or sale is
made in an offshore transaction."' Under Rule 902(i) of the Securi-
ties Act, in order for an offer or sale of securities to be an offshore
transaction, (i) the offer must not be made to a person in the United
States22 and (ii) either (a) the buyer must be outside the United States
(or the seller must reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the
United States) at the time of sale or (b) the transaction, for the pur-
poses of Rule 903, must be "executed in, on or through a physical
trading floor of an established foreign securities exchange that is lo-
cated outside the United States" and the seller must not have reason
to believe that the transaction has been prearranged with a buyer in
the United States.24
In pure geographic terms, the offshore transaction requirement
works to ensure that the core of the transaction - the actual offer and
sale of securities - occurs outside the physical borders of the United
States. The first basic requirement of Regulation S, therefore, embod-
ies the territorial basis of the exemption. Sales occurring within the
United States, for example, may not take advantage of Regulation S
and, in the absence of some other exemption, come squarely within
the grasp of Section 5.
Not all offers and sales which occur physically outside the United
States are exempt under Regulation S, however. The second basic re-
20 For more detailed discussion of the details of Regulation S, see Guy P. Lander, Regulation
S - Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 339, 341
(1996); Testy, supra note 15; Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., Regulation S and Rule
144A: Creating a Workable Fiction on an Expanding Global Securities Market, 29 IN'L LAW. 43
(1995); Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 347 (1995).
21 See Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.901 (1994).
22 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.903(a) (1994); 17 C.F.R. 230.904(a) (1994).
23 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.902(i)(1)(i) (1994).
24 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.902(i)(1)(ii) (1994). Rule 902(a) defines "designated
offshore securities market" to include the Eurobond market, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the
Toronto Stock Exchange among other markets. See Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.902(a)
(1994).
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quirement of Regulation S requires that sellers cannot make any "di-
rected selling efforts" within the United States.25 "Directed selling
efforts" is defined in Rule 902(b) as "any activity undertaken for the
purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the effect of,
conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities
being offered.... ,26 Although the offer and sale portion of a transac-
tion may take place outside the territorial borders of the United
States, other preliminary steps may actually occur within its borders.
The ban on directed selling attempts to limit such preliminary steps.
Out of a fear that such selling efforts may adversely impact non-re-
lated transactions within the United States, only those extraterritorial
transactions with a minimal effect on the U.S. capital markets are ex-
empted from the second basic requirement. The definition of "di-
rected selling efforts" in Rule 902(b), for example, excludes certain
tombstone advertisements as well as placements in an advertisement
required to be published under U.S. or foreign law.27
2. Requirements of Rule 903 (the Issuer Safe Harbor)
Rule 903 sets out the core of Regulation S: the issuer safe har-
bor.' In addition to the two basic requirements described above,
Rule 903 requires that issuers satisfy certain conditions based on the
nature of the issuer and the securities involved in the transaction.
Three categories of transactions are contemplated, based on the likeli-
hood that the securities from an issue will flow back into the United
States and on the level of reporting to which the issuer is subject in the
United States.
The first category is outlined in Rule 903(c)(1) and represents
those securities with the least likelihood of flowback into the United
States.2 9 Both domestic and foreign issuers may take advantage of
this category to the extent the two basic requirements are also met.
Foreign issuers that reasonably believe no "substantial U.S. market
interest" 30 exists at the start of the offering for the class of securities to
25 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.903(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. 230.904(b) (1994).
26 Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.902(b) (1994).
27 See Regulation S Rules, 17 C.F.R. 230.902(b) (1994).
28 This safe harbor applies to "the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective affiliates, or
any person acting on [their] behalf.. ." 17 C.F.R. §230.903 (1994). For convenience we will use
the term issuer to refer to these parties collectively.
29 The category also includes securities backed by the full faith and credit of a foreign gov-
ernment, and employee benefit plan securities, which we will not discuss here. 17 C.F.R.
§230.903(c)(i) (1994).
30 The definition of this term is given by Rule 902(n). With respect to equity securities, there
is a substantial United States interest if U.S. exchanges constituted the largest market for such
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be offered or sold may qualify under Rule 903(c)(1) for treatment as
outside the United States.3 ' Because these issues are undertaken by
foreign issuers and purchased primarily by foreign investors, the risk
of a flowback into the United States is considered small.
Likewise, both foreign and domestic issuers that engage in "over-
seas directed offerings" can benefit from the safe harbor of Rule
903(c)(1). The term "overseas directed offering" is defined in Rule
902(j) as (1) "an offering... of a foreign issuer that is directed into a
single country other than the United States to the residents thereof"
and that complies with the laws of that country; or (2) "an offering of
non-convertible debt securities... of a domestic issuer that is directed
into a single country other than the United States to the residents
thereof" that complies with local law and that is not denominated in
U.S. dollars and whose securities are "neither convertible into U.S.
dollar-denominated securities nor linked to U.S. dollars .... 132 Be-
cause the risk of securities sold within one targeted foreign country
flowing back to the United States is assumed to be low, such transac-
tions are accorded an exemption from Section 5. Furthermore, to the
extent the issue is primarily within the borders of one country, the
potential conflict between U.S. regulations and the foreign country's
own regulations would otherwise be at its greatest.
The second category of issuers exempt through Rule 903 are
those classified under Rule 903(c)(2). Under Rule 903(c)(2), so long
as the two basic requirements of Regulation S are fulfilled, all Ex-
change Act reporting companies that undertake specified transac-
tional and offering restrictions are considered engaged in a transaction
outside the United States and therefore eligible for Rule 901's safe
harbor. The transactional restrictions of Rule 903(c)(2), in turn, state
that no offer or sale may be made to a U.S. person or for the account
or benefit of a U.S. person during a 40 day restricted period.33 Fur-
thermore, prior to the expiration of the 40 day restricted period, each
distributor of the securities must send a confirmation notice with all
securities sold to another distributor or dealer stating that the pur-
securities in question or if at least 20% of all trading in the class of securities took place in U.S.
exchanges and inter-dealer quotation systems and less than 55% took place through the facilities
of any one foreign securities market. 17 C.F.R. §230.902(n)(1) (1994). With respect to debt
securities, a substantial market exists if U.S. persons hold a sufficiently large quantity of the debt
securities and if 20% or more of the debt outstanding is held in the United States. 17 C.F.R.
§230.902(n)(2) (1994).
31 17 C.F.R. §230.903(c)(i)(A-D) (1994).
32 17 C.F.R. §230.902G) (1994).
33 See 17 C.F.R. §230.903(c)(2)(iii) (1994).
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chaser is subject to the same restrictions on offers and sales that apply
to a distributor.34 Section 903(c)(2)'s offering restrictions, in turn, re-
quire that each distributor agree in writing that all offers and sales of
the securities prior to the expiration of the restricted period will be
made only in accordance with the provisions of Rule 903 or Rule 904,
under Section 5 registration or pursuant to another exemption from
Section 5.35 The offering restrictions also require that all offering
materials and documents (except press releases) contain legends de-
tailing the securities' restricted status.3 6 Non-Exchange Act reporting
foreign companies making sales of non-convertible debt securities and
meeting the same restrictions may similarly make use of Rule
903(c)(2).
The third and final category of issuers relevant to Rule 903 in-
cludes all issuers that do not belong to either of the other two cate-
gories. This category includes non-Exchange Act reporting foreign
companies issuing equity securities and all non-Exchange Act report-
ing domestic issuers. Securities in this category have the greatest
chance of flowback into the United States with no concomitant source
of information on the securities within the United States. As a result,
pursuant to Rule 903(c)(3), such issuers can take advantage of the
Rule 901 safe harbor only if they comply with the two basic require-
ments,37 the same offering restrictions as in Rule 903(c)(2) and addi-
tional transactional restrictions more severe than those in Rule
903(c)(2). 38 The transactional restrictions of Rule 903(c)(3), for exam-
ple, include, among others, a requirement that the purchaser agrees to
resell the securities only in accordance with Regulation S39 or in com-
pliance with registration requirements or another available exemption
from registration. The SEC justifies the greater transactional restric-
tions within Rule 903(c)(3) as necessary "to protect against an unreg-
istered U.S. distributor when there is little, if any, information
34 17 C.F.R. §230.903(2)(iv) (1994). The definition of a restricted period is given in Rule
902(m). The period starts on the later of the day the securities were first offered to persons
other than distributors or the date of closing of the offering.
35 See 17 C.F.R. §230.903(c)(2)(ii) (1994); see also 17 C.F.R. §230.902(h)(1) (1994).
36 See 17 C.F.R. §230.902(h)(2) (1994).
37 See 17 C.F.R.§230.903(c)(3)(i) (1994).
38 More specifically, equity is subject to a one year restricted period and debt is subject to a
40 day restricted period. See 17 C.F.R §230.903(c)(3)(ii)(A), (iii)(A) (1994).




available to the marketplace about the issuer and its securities and
there is a significant likelihood of flowback.
40
B. The Reach of the Antifraud Rules
Although not completely territorial-based, Regulation S does
grant issuers of securities into foreign markets some measure of pro-
tection from the Securities Act's registration requirements. With this
exemption also comes relief from the transaction-specific antifraud
rules that apply to the public offering documents. Section 11,41 which
applies only to the registration statement, does not apply to transac-
tions exempt under Regulation S. Similarly, Section 12(a)(2), 42 which
covers only prospectuses pursuant to a public offering under Section
5, also lacks force.
At least one antifraud provision, however, continues to apply.
Rule 10b-5, under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, covers all trans-
actions "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."43
Although other exempt transactions from Section 5, including intra-
state offerings and private placements, avoid Section 11 and Section
12(a)(2) liability, they remain subject to Rule 10b-5. The question re-
mains, therefore, how far does the reach of Rule 10b-5 extend to
cover exempt overseas transactions.
As is the case with the Securities Act's registration requirements
under Section 5, the Exchange Act restricts the reach of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 only through its requirement that there be some use of
interstate commerce." The exact extent of this reach, however, is am-
biguous. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act only makes it unlawful to
employ "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ... by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails" in "the purchase or sale of any security . . . ."45 Section
3(a)(17) of the Exchange Act, in turn, defines interstate commerce as
"trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the sev-
eral States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between
any State and any place or ship outside thereof. '46 Unlike Regulation
40 Lander, supra note 20, at 369 (citing Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release
No. 6863 [1989 - 1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 80,670, at 80675 (May 2,
1990)).
41 See 15 U.S.C. §77k (1994).
42 See 15 U.S.C. §771(a)(2) (1994).
43 See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1994).
44 Id.
45 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1994).
46 See 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(17) (1994).
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S, however, the SEC has not clarified the reach of Rule 10b-5 outside
the United States. Instead, the reach of Section 10(b) has been left to
the courts, which have grappled with the issue of extraterritoriality on
a case-by-case basis.47
Today, therefore the question remains unanswered: To what ex-
tent can American laws govern activity that takes place outside its
borders? Courts have applied two primary tests to answer this ques-
tion: the conduct test and the effects test. Each are described below.
48
1. The Conduct Test (Territoriality)
Under the conduct test, a primarily territorial-based rule, jurisdic-
tion is conferred on events based on their location. In the case of
securities, therefore, the issuer and investor can avoid the jurisdiction
of a country simply by moving their transaction abroad. The rule of
territoriality is the simplest of the possible jurisdictional rules because
it partitions the world neatly into mutually exclusive legal regimes.
Every country legislates with respect to its own geographic territory
and imposes its own rules.
The general principle of territoriality was bluntly expressed by
the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,4 9 a
case in which an American plaintiff sought damages in an antitrust
claim against an American defendant for actions alleged to have oc-
curred in Costa Rica.50 For the Court, Justice Holmes held that
American courts lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, stating that "the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country in which the act is done."'" This rule is
known as the "conduct test" because jurisdiction is exercised based on
the location of the parties' conduct.
One difficulty with the conduct test is defining what actions count
as "conduct" for purposes of determining territoriality. In a securities
transaction, for example, many actions may lead up to the ultimate
transaction; telephone calls may cross jurisdictional boundaries, attor-
neys may conduct cross-border investigations and funds may flow in-
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1994).
48 Additionally, the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United States pro-
vides guidance on extraterritoriality. See RESTATEMENT (Third) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §416 (1987); see also Gary A. Born, A Reappraisal of
the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 37 (1992) (analyzing the
Third Restatement).
49 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
50 Id. at 354-55.
51 Id. at 356.
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ternationally. A workable conduct test, therefore, must specify the
amount and type of conduct that is necessary in order to trigger juris-
diction. U.S. circuit courts are split on exactly how much conduct is
necessary. The Second Circuit established a very restrictive require-
ment in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.52 In Bersch, Judge Friendly
held that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of
material importance occurred in this country;
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to American residents
abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material
importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside
the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses.
53
Thus, "merely preparatory" acts are insufficient to trigger jurisdiction
when the injury is to foreigners located abroad, but may be sufficient
when the injury is to resident Americans.54 The Second Circuit test in
Bersch was later adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Zoelsch v. Arthur An-
derson-5 Other circuits, including the Third, Eighth and Ninth, how-
ever, have adopted a broader standard for the assertion of
jurisdiction.56 They have held that jurisdiction exists "where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within
this country. '57 Under this broader form of the conduct test, there-
fore, even preparatory acts such as making initial phone calls and
soliciting potential foreign investors in the United States may trigger
jurisdiction.
52 Bersch v. Drexel Fireston4 Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
53 Id. at 993.
54 Id. at 992. See also IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920-921 (2d Cir. 1980) (clarifying the
distinction between acts that are merely preparatory and those that directly cause injury).
55 Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson, 824 F.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (interpreting the Second
Circuit's test to mean that jurisdiction will lie in American courts where the domestic conduct
satisfies the requisite elements for liability under Section 10 or Rule 10b-5).
56 See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (granting jurisdiction "where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country"), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
420 (8th Cir. 1979) (granting jurisdiction where defendants' conduct "furthered the fraudulent
scheme" and was "significant with respect to the alleged violation"); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,
712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Eighth Circuit's test in Continental Grain).
For more detail on the conduct test in the context of securities regulation, see Testy, supra note
15, at 934-35.
57 Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
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Problems exist with the implementation of either form of conduct
test, however. Where significant conduct occurs in more than one ju-
risdiction, conflict may exist between jurisdictions applying a conduct-
based rule. Two countries, for example, may both have enough activ-
ity within their borders to trigger conduct-based jurisdiction under the
Zoelsch rule. This is particularly true for transactions involving securi-
ties, an essentially intangible product. Offers and sales of securities
may occur simultaneously across the borders of two countries; a seller
located in the United States, for example, may telephone buyers lo-
cated in Sweden to complete a sales transaction. Furthermore, the
conduct-test provides little guidance in determining which acts are
central to the transaction and which are merely preparatory.
2. The Effects Test (Extraterritoriality)
Many countries, including the United States, do not apply a true
version of territoriality in the application of their antifraud rules. Ju-
risdiction for antifraud rules is often aggressively asserted.5 8 Within
the United States, the seminal case dealing with antifraud securities
regulation is Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.9 In that case, an American
plaintiff and shareholder of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation,
alleged a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, claiming that
the company's controlling shareholders had arranged to purchase
shares from the corporation for a price below fair market value.60 De-
spite the fact that the transaction took place entirely within Canada,
the Second Circuit held that
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the
Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which are alleged to
violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the
transactions involve stocks registered and listed on a national securities
exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American
investors... 61
The Schoenbaum court argued that the sale of undervalued stock in
Canada would unduly depress stock listed on the American Exchange,
58 See, e.g., John C. Maguire, Regulatory Conflicts: International Tender and Exchange Offers
in the 1990s, 19 PnPp. L. REv. 939, 949 (1992); Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release
No. 33,6779 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,242, at 89,128-30 (June
10, 1988).
59 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
60 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the insiders had purchased the shares based on infor-
mation not yet disclosed to the public.
61 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
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thereby generating enough effect on the U.S. market to justify U.S.
jurisdiction.62
Schoenbaum, therefore, applied jurisdiction, not based on any
conduct which occurred within the United States, but rather based on
the effect of the transaction on the American capital markets. Note,
however, that though Schoenbaum is cited as an example of the effects
test, the court did not state that an effect on American investors alone
was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Rather, the court suggested that
a listing on a U.S. exchange is an important element in generating
enough of an effect on the U.S. capital markets to justify jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the principle of Schoenbaum's effects test has been fol-
lowed in several other cases.63
III. THE NECESSITY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Despite the current extraterritorial reach of Regulation S and the
various extraterritorial tests that have been applied to extend the
reach of Rule 10b-5 internationally, it remains unclear why U.S. laws
should apply to transactions occurring mostly in other countries. This
section (1) analyzes the goals of securities regulation conventionally
used to justify extraterritoriality; (2) outlines a more appropriate role
for extraterritoriality; (3) presents alternatives to the American extra-
territoriality regime; and finally, (4) discusses the multiple listing
problem.
A. The Goals of Extraterritoriality
The purposes of extraterritorial application of disclosure require-
ments and antifraud liability are rarely stated clearly. This may be
because, as this paper argues, the justification for such practices is not
entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, this section will attempt to review
the reasons behind extraterritoriality.
1. Conventional Goals
Several conventional goals are commonly put forth in defense of
extraterritoriality. The most common justification for the application
62 Id. at 208-209.
63 See, e.g., SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028,1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that trading, "on
the basis of inside information, options of a United States corporation listed exclusively on a
United States stock exchange ... create[s] the near certainty that United States sharehold-
ers... [will] be adversely affected ...."); Des Brisay v. The Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 136
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he transaction in question ... involved the improper use of securi-
ties ... listed on a national exchange and adversely affected not only the plaintiffs but the
American market...").
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of U.S. laws to transactions that take place abroad is the protection of
American investors. For example, in Regulation S's predecessor, Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-4708,64 the SEC stated:
[T]he Commission has traditionally taken the position that the registra-
tion requirements of Section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to pro-
tect American investors. Accordingly, the Commission has not taken
any action for failure to register securities of United States corporations
distributed abroad to foreign nationals .... [I]t is immaterial whether
the offering originates from within or outside the United States, whether
domestic or foreign broker-dealers are involved and whether the actual
mechanics of the distribution are effected within the United States, so
long as the offering is made under circumstances reasonably designed to
preclude distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to na-
tionals of, the United States.
65
Regulatory protection of investors, however, may not always ad-
vance investor welfare. Certainly, other areas of the U.S. securities
regime recognize that at least some investors are able to negotiate for
information and make informed investment decisions without such
protections.66 For instance, Regulation D allows issuers to make pri-
vate placements to certain sophisticated, accredited investors without
any mandatory information disclosure. 67 Allowing investors able to
fend for themselves to select the amount of regulatory protection they
desire through investments in other jurisdictions may, in fact, increase
social welfare. To the extent that extra regulatory protections are
costly to issuers and not valued by sophisticated investors, global capi-
tal market efficiency is increased by allowing such issuers and inves-
tors to bypass these regulatory protections through their selection of
an alternate securities regime.
Moreover, American investors are sufficiently well-protected if
they understand that they are purchasing securities under a legal re-
gime that differs from that of the United States. With this knowledge,
investors can decide whether the risks are worth taking and how much
they are willing to pay for a particular security. Investors in securities
64 See Testy, supra note 15.
65 Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
33,4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361, at 2124 (July 9, 1964).
66 Note that some argue that companies will voluntarily release information to alleviate the
problem of asymmetric information. Otherwise, investors may choose not to purchase the secur-
ities or else discount the price heavily for the risk of purchasing a lemon. See Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv.
669, 673-74 (1984). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. Rav. 717, 722 (1984) (arguing that the incentive of
managers to profit from insider-trading, among other reasons, may result in less than optimal
company voluntary disclosure).
67 See Rules 501-508, Regulation D, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §230.501-508 (1994).
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markets world-wide price securities based on the information avail-
able and the regulatory structure in place. Investors as a group (i.e.,
the market) are able to assess the value of the securities they are re-
ceiving and adjust the price they will pay such that they receive a nor-
mal return, on average, adjusted for non-diversifiable risk. Americans
entering foreign markets can therefore purchase securities under the
rules in place in that market and can expect the same returns and risks
that other participants in the market expect. Investors who prefer to
purchase only those issues that are subject to the American regulatory
system can, of course, choose to invest accordingly. It may be costly
for the investor to retain American regulatory protections to the ex-
tent that issuers who do not wish to shoulder the expense of compli-
ance with American disclosure laws exclude investors from issues that
offer an attractive risk-return profile.
Finally, in order to protect all American investors, the United
States may need to extend its regulatory protection to the rest of the
world. Today, U.S. investors use international means of communica-
tion to purchase securities around the globe. An investor located in
Aurora, Illinois, for example, may use her computer to track securities
prices in London and to purchase or sell such securities - through her
broker - in real-time on the London Stock Exchange. The United
States, however, lacks both the informational resources and interna-
tional influence to force all other countries to comply with its vision of
securities regulation. Practically, without the acquiescence of other
countries, the United States faces an absolute limit on how far it may
extend its jurisdiction.
In recognition of these limits, the SEC promulgated Regulation S
to govern exemptions for overseas transactions from Section 5's regis-
tration requirements. As outlined in Part II, Regulation S marked a
change in emphasis by the SEC from the protection of American in-
vestors, wherever they may be located, to the protection of American
capital markets.68 In the words of the SEC, "[a]s investors choose
their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such
markets.
'69
The protection of American markets, as opposed to individual in-
vestors, is consistent with the apparent objectives of the Exchange
68 See Arbie R. Thalacker, Reproposed Regulation S, 683 PLI/Coxu. 799, 805 (1990); Marc I.
Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., Regulation S and Rule 144A: Creating a Workable Fiction on
an Expanding Global Securities Market, 29 NT'L LAW. 43, 47 (1995).
69 Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33,6863, [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,524, at 80,665 (April 24, 1990).
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Act. Section 2 of the Exchange Act states that one of its goals is to
"insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets .... 170 A similar
view is expressed by Judge Lumbard in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
who seemed to accept both justifications for extraterritoriality, stating
that:
Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application
in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign secur-
ities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities mar-
ket from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American
securities.7 1
Careful analysis, however, demonstrates that foreign transactions
do not generally represent a significant threat to American capital
markets. To see why this is so, it is important to keep in mind that the
securities regime governing a transaction of a security impacts the se-
curity's price. Thus, a security may be worth more under one regime
than it is under another regime, assuming that arbitrage is not possi-
ble.72 Suppose, for example, that an American investor purchases a
security governed by the law of a foreign country. Suppose further
that the law of that country allows transactions to take place in a man-
ner that would be considered fraudulent under American law. Obvi-
ously, the investor will pay less, all else equal, for that security in the
foreign country than she would in the United States. The price will be
lower because the investor faces a greater probability of being de-
frauded. If she is, in fact cheated, however, there is no direct effect on
American capital markets. Investors who purchase shares in the
American market need concern themselves only with the risks inher-
ent in that market. Transactions of this sort do not impose a negative
externality on American capital markets.
Extraterritoriality, therefore, provides little protection to U.S.
capital markets. Imagine, for example, that the United States es-
chewed the effects test and instead followed a strictly territorial rule
of jurisdiction under a conduct-based test. Under such a rule, any
transactions occurring within a U.S. exchange or market would be
governed by U.S. laws while those occurring in another jurisdiction
would follow the law of that jurisdiction. It is true that transactions in
70 15 U.S.C. 78b (1994). See also Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir.
1977) (stating that it was Congress's intent "to protect the integrity of domestic securities mar-
kets in a particular stock").
71 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
72 Obviously, if it is possible to buy a security under one regime and then sell it under a
different regime, thereby changing the protections afforded the buyer, the security would have to
sell for the same price in both markets.
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other jurisdictions may have an indirect "effect" on the U.S. market.
For example, U.S.-based investors purchasing securities overseas in a
market without any antifraud protection may very well get duped and
lose all their funds; such investors, in turn, may default on their mar-
gin payments and invest less in American markets as a result, reducing
the overall liquidity of those markets. Similarly, American companies
seeking to raise capital may encounter jurisdictions with more desira-
ble - from the companies' standpoint - regimes, leading them to exit
the American market, again reducing the size and liquidity of the
American capital market.
However, the mere fact that other countries impose such an indi-
rect effect on the United States is no reason to extend extraterritorial-
ity. In fact, this effect often results in competitive pressures between
regimes, leading to beneficial results as countries compete for both
issuers and investors.73 In cases where a beneficial effect does not
arise, but rather countries impose a negative externality on one an-
other - for example, where a country allows itself to become a safe
harbor for insider trading - countries should seek to employ either
bilateral or multilateral agreements to achieve mutual cooperation
over these issues or search for more direct solutions at home.74
Finally, extraterritoriality is conventionally justified as a means of
protecting the impression foreign investors have of American compa-
nies. This view assumes foreign investors identify the actions of U.S.
companies with the application of U.S. laws. Therefore, to the extent
U.S. laws do not actually apply and, as a result, American companies
go overseas and commit fraud, the world's impression of the U.S. se-
73 See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regula-
tory Competition, 55-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 174-75 (1992) (setting forth the possi-
bility that countries may either race-to-the-top or race-to-the-bottom in their securities
regulatory regimes); Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws and International
Money: Securities Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FoRDHAm L. REV. (forthcoming
April 1997)(setting forth a framework to analyze regulatory competition among countries and
concluding that competition can lead to desirable diversity among regimes).
74 Even here, it is unclear whether insider trading actually imposes a negative externality
between countries. For example, suppose company 1 is located in country A. Assume further
that company 1 has securities listed in both country A and country B. Now suppose executives
from company 1 choose to engage in insider trading within the borders of country B's securities
markets. Only investors in country B's market stand to lose directly from such trades, reducing
the confidence of investors in country B's markets. Country A, however, is not affected in any
direct manner. Note that two negative externalities are nevertheless possible. First, managers of
company 1 may choose to engage in projects more suitable for insider trading - e.g., projects
involving confidential information - not because such projects are the highest value projects
available but because the managers may gain more through insider trading. Second, managers
may also delay information disclosure in both countries, or engage in misleading practices, to
increase the value of their ability to conduct insider trading in country B.
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curities system will decline. In turn, this hurts the ability of American
companies to raise capital abroad and reduces the amount of funds
foreign investors place in the U.S. capital market.75
In response, it is difficult to see why rational investors would mis-
takenly - on a systematic basis - associate American companies with
U.S. laws even where the companies trade abroad and U.S. laws do
not apply. Through arbitrage, at the least, investors armed with the
correct information would place pressure on securities prices to incor-
porate the true regulatory rights possessed by securities around the
world. For example, if an American company's securities issued in
South Africa lack the protection of American antifraud rules, then the
prices of those securities would reflect this lack of protection. If, in-
stead, some investors mistakenly believe that American laws do apply
and overvalue the securities as a result, other investors will sell short
the securities, placing downward pressure on the securities price until
it reflects the lack of antifraud protection.
Furthermore, even where systematic mistakes regarding the ap-
plication of U.S. laws to American companies exists, extraterritoriality
is not the best means of combating this false impression. Rather, cor-
recting this impression is better accomplished through a more direct
approach. For example, clearly establishing when U.S. laws apply and
when other countries' laws apply will work to educate investors about
the scope of U.S. laws. To the extent that foreign investors have a
false impression about U.S. laws, rather than extending the reach of
the American securities regime, educating investors and implementing
clear jurisdictional lines will prove both more cost-effective and more
workable.
2. Capital Mobility and the Securities Goals
Before we can assess the desirability of a particular set of jurisdic-
tional rules, we must step back and ask ourselves what goals the secur-
ities regulatory regime should seek to achieve. Traditionally,
extraterritoriality has been justified as a means to protect U.S. inves-
tors and the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. However, as dis-
cussed above, extraterritoriality is neither necessary nor effective in
accomplishing these goals.
Extraterritoriality brings with it several costs. For instance, regu-
lations that limit the ability of American investors to purchase securi-
ties issued abroad have a direct and harmful impact on capital





mobility. Although extraterritoriality does not directly prohibit over-
seas transactions, by forcing participants to accept American laws, it
imposes extra costs on such transactions. To avoid these regulations,
for example, some foreign issuers may simply restrict their offerings to
investors who are not residents of the United States. Extraterritorial-
ity, therefore, may exclude certain issues from the set of options avail-
able to American investors.76 Foreign issuers also lose the liquidity
provided by the participation of American investors. This reduction
in capital mobility is harmful to all parties in the market. For the
issuer, a smaller pool of potential investors makes it more difficult to
sell-out its offering. Because the United States is one of the largest
sources of capital in the international market, an issuer that cannot
tap the American market faces a much larger challenge than an issuer
that can. A smaller market implies that at any given price, the de-
mand for a particular security will be lower. In order to sell a particu-
lar volume of securities, therefore, the issuer may have to lower the
price of its securities.
Furthermore, a reduction in the liquidity of the international cap-
ital market is harmful to overall global welfare. A reduction in the
number of investors will drive down the price of securities issues,
making it unprofitable for certain projects to be funded in this man-
ner. If these projects cannot be financed in some other way (e.g.,
through a private loan), they are lost; to the extent that with adequate
financing these projects had a positive net expected value, society
loses. Among those securities that are available to Americans, the
opposite may occur. Because American investors have fewer options,
they may bid up the price of those securities that comply with Ameri-
can law.77
76 See supra section II.
77 It is, of course, possible that extraterritorial application of U.S. law will merely result in a
shift of investments. That is, U.S. investors will invest in those projects that satisfy U.S. law and,
in doing so, will displace foreign investors who will then invest in securities that do not comply
with U.S. law. This result, however, is very unlikely. In order for the international capital mar-
ket to be unaffected, every dollar that U.S. investors spend on offerings that satisfy U.S. law and
that they would otherwise spend on other offerings in the absence of an extraterritorial law must
be offset by exactly one dollar from a foreign investor who would have invested in those securi-
ties but chooses not to because of the greater presence of U.S. investors. Even under an assump-
tion of perfect capital markets, this result will not be obtained if only because compliance with
U.S. securities laws is expensive. A firm that must decide whether to comply with U.S. law in
order to gain access to U.S. investors will factor into the decision the cost of compliance. There-
fore, even if it would be possible to raise more capital by fulfilling the requirements of U.S. law,
the issuer may nevertheless choose not to do so because the additional funds are outweighed by
the cost of compliance. This means that in a perfect capital market, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. law will make selling to U.S. investors more expensive than excluding them. There-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:207 (1996)
Finally, extraterritorial jurisdiction reduces the range of invest-
ments available to American investors. Rather than being able to
choose from the full array of securities issued around the world,
American investors are limited to those that comply with American
disclosure requirements. In other words, U.S. law travels with the in-
vestor. As a result, the investor will be less able to diversify her port-
folio internationally.
78
Given the problems with extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is impor-
tant first to re-think exactly what it means to "protect" investors and
the market. With respect to the protection of investors, we suggest
that an appropriate goal is to ensure that investors are able to under-
stand and anticipate the legal regime that will apply to them when
they invest. Investors with such knowledge will make rational deci-
sions about whether or not to invest in a particular market and, if they
do so, how much to discount the price of securities in that market. If,
for example, an investor wishes to invest in securities abroad, under
the legal regime of a foreign country, they should be allowed to do so.
If that legal regime lacks certain protections that exist in the United
States, the investor is able to anticipate the lack of protection and ad-
just the price she is willing to pay accordingly. There is no injustice or
inefficiency if, after purchasing a security with an understanding of the
relevant legal regime, the investor suffers a loss. It is in the nature of
securities that they are risky, and it is up to the investor to assess the
risk prior to investing.
With respect to protecting the American market, securities regu-
lation should seek to promote a well-informed and efficient capital
market. This can be done through disclosure and antifraud require-
ments for transactions occurring within the United States. In the
global arena, however, extending these provisions extraterritorially
does not necessarily work to further the goals of capital market integ-
rity. In fact, extraterritoriality may simply close the U.S. market off to
regulatory competition. In an international context, the most effective
protection for investors and for the integrity of the U.S. capital mar-
fore, the market will find an equilibrium at which, compared to the outcome in the absence of
U.S. extraterritorialism, the ratio of offerings to potential investors in the non-U.S. market is
higher and the ratio in the U.S. market is lower. The result will be that the expected return on
the purchase of a security will be lower in the U.S. market than in either the non-U.S. market or
the global market that would exist in the absence of U.S. extraterritorialism.
78 For an analysis of the benefits investors obtain from diversification, see Richard A.
Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 129-174 (4th ed. 1991).
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kets derives from one source: greater capital mobility.79 Where extra-
territoriality forces investors or issuers to carry the American
regulatory regime with them even when they choose to conduct busi-
ness outside the United States, capital is not truly mobile.
Limited application of U.S. laws, as a result, translates directly
into greater choice for investors and issuers. In turn, greater mobility
leads to more competition between jurisdictions to attract both issuers
and investors. In selecting a jurisdiction, issuers will take into account
the cost of the securities regulatory regime and the price investors are
willing to pay for securities. Investors, in turn, will pay based on the
chance of fraud and other risks in the offering. Regulations, for exam-
ple, that increase the expense to issuers by less than they increase the
willingness of investors to pay for securities, will raise the number of
issuers seeking to offer securities. Competition among countries for
securities transaction volume, therefore, will result in countries racing
to adopt regulations that maximize the joint welfare of investors and
issuers.80 Within the United States, therefore, international mobility
restrains the ability of regulators to pursue their own bureaucratic
goals or cater to specific industry interests.
In a world where countries, investors, and issuers differ in their
size and preferences for information disclosure and risk, a range of
different regimes tailored to the different groups may arise. This
range of regimes, in turn, provides investors with information on the
types of issuers that select to issue securities in any particular regime.
Issuers, for example, that choose to issue securities in a regime spe-
cializing in minimizing disclosure costs will be viewed by investors as
carrying a higher risk of fraud; investors will discount these issues ap-
propriately, shifting the cost of fraud back to the issuers. Moreover,
only investors confident in their ability to assess companies operating
under a regime lacking strong securities regulatory protection will
choose to make purchases. Greater mobility works to increase the
range of these different regimes by raising the ability of issuers and
investors to separate themselves according to their preferred regimes.
More mobility, therefore, results in a greater separation among issuers
79 For a more detailed discussion of the benefits of capital mobility, see Stephen J. Choi and
Andrew T. Guzman, supra note 73.
80 On the other hand, where managers control the selection of a jurisdiction and the manag-
ers seek to maximize their own welfare, some racing-toward-the-bottom may occur. However,
even to the extent this occurs somewhat, in a world where a range of companies, investors, and
countries exist, increased mobility - by leading to a separation among different types of regimes
- still benefits investors worldwide through the increase in information such separation provides
investors. See Choi and Guzman, supra note 73.
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and investors of different types, leading to more information for inves-
tors and, thereby, more efficient capital allocation.81
B. Reforming Extraterritoriality
Taking the goals of protecting the capital markets of the United
States and American investors as a given, we now turn to consider the
proper role for securities regulation in an international environment.
We argue that the current application of U.S. securities laws to trans-
actions that take place abroad is unnecessary and, in light of the fact
that it imposes costly limitations on capital mobility, should be signifi-
cantly curtailed.
For many transactions, no issue of extraterritoriality exists. Both
buyer and seller reside in the same country, and all communication
and information flow occurs within that same country. The laws of the
domestic country, therefore, unambiguously apply to the transaction.
Not all transactions are as clear-cut, however. For example, informa-
tion on a transaction between two Canadian parties may travel
through internet lines via connections in the United States. Similarly,
transactions may occur between parties physically located in different
countries. For transactions that spillover into several countries, some
sort of extraterritorial application of laws is inevitable. Because the
transaction is simply not located completely within one country, to the
extent any individual country attempts to assert jurisdiction, it affects
the markets of the other countries.
Because some extraterritoriality is inevitable in the global mar-
ketplace, the true question is how far should any one country's extra-
territorial reach extend. As discussed in Part II. B., the United States
takes a mixed conduct/effects test approach in determining this reach
for its antifraud rules. This Article proposes two reforms to this ap-
proach to further the ability of investors and issuers to choose their
own regime. First, the rule of extraterritoriality should be a bright-
line rule that offers parties the opportunity to make a clear ex ante
choice. Second, some choice should exist; in other words, parties that
desire to avoid their own domestic country laws should - at a reason-
able cost - be able to do so.
For example, the conduct-based test - although embodying a ter-
ritorial rule of sorts - suffers from both uncertainty and an overly
broad reach. The conduct-based test tends to sweep within its reach
81 For a discussion of how such a separating equilibrium may come about see Choi & Guz-
man, supra note 73, at passim.
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actions taken by domestic investors and issuers seeking to execute a
transaction abroad. To the extent that preparatory actions are in-
cluded as conduct sufficient to trigger jurisdiction and to the extent
that such preparatory actions in the United States are hard to avoid,
the conduct-test artificially restricts mobility. As discussed above, mo-
bility allows issuers and investors to choose which regime should gov-
ern their actions. Through such "votes," issuers and investors are able
to apply competitive pressure on individual country regulators.
Therefore, even where investors and issuers take preparatory action
within one nation's boundaries, so long as they signal their desire to
be part of another country's regime, only that other country's laws
should apply. Investors and issuers can signal this desire by executing
their transaction abroad. Furthermore, because the conduct-based
test's notion of what actions count as "conduct" differs across the vari-
ous circuit courts and is far from a bright-line rule, parties seeking to
elect another jurisdiction's securities laws face the cost of uncertainty
in their election. This uncertainty, in turn, may chill such an ex ante
election.
Bringing a clear-definition of what counts as conduct to the con-
duct-based test and excluding preparatory acts done in the United
States increases the mobility of investors and issuers. With a clear-
rule, investors and issuers may rely ex ante on their election of re-
gimes; furthermore, to the extent preparatory acts in the United
States are not counted, such parties do not incur a substantial cost-
penalty from their election. In fact, so long as the two principles of
clarity and cost equality are met, the exact nature of the extraterrito-
rial rule does not matter. A clear rule gives parties the ability to struc-
ture their transaction ex ante and, thereby, take the necessary actions
to select the jurisdiction of their choice. With relative cost equality,
parties will not be unduly biased in this selection but rather will select
based on which regulatory regime provides the parties, as a group,
with the greatest net benefits.
What does matter, however, is that the rule of extraterritoriality
that is adopted creates the least amount of conflict with other jurisdic-
tions' rules.' Ideally, in any given transaction, only one jurisdiction's
rules would apply. If this were not the case, then parties lose the abil-
ity to select ex ante the jurisdiction of their choice. At the very least, a
relatively inexpensive method should exist for parties to structure
82 Indeed, some commentators argue that one defect of the conduct and effects tests is the
lack of concern for principles of comity between nations. See Philip R. Wolf, International Secur-
ities Fraud: Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 8 N.Y. INr'L L. Ray. 1, 13-14 (1995).
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their transactions to elect the jurisdiction of their choice. One method
of reducing the cost of this election is the "connection" test of jurisdic-
tion. Under the connection test, the country with the greatest amount
of contact with the transaction obtains territorial jurisdiction. This ap-
proach is supported by many commentators.8 3 Although it avoids
problems of duplicative jurisdiction, the connection test as applied to-
day is somewhat vague. For example, it leaves unclear what connec-
tions are relevant and what to do if two countries both have equally
strong connections. Therefore, this article argues for a modified ver-
sion of the connection test.
Specifically, the connection test should attempt to further the
ability of investors and issuers to select their own regimes. In addi-
tion, the test should make the choice of controlling jurisdiction as
clear as possible to potential issuers and investors. We suggest that
the connection test focus on the location with the most relation to the
actual matching of the buyer and seller. Such a rule both provides
clarity and minimizes the cost to parties seeking to switch jurisdic-
tions. Note, for example, that this implies that all offshore transac-
tions - as defined in Rule 903(a) under Regulation S - would be
considered beyond the reach of American courts. For transactions
which occur on exchanges or are otherwise executed through an ex-
change system located within one country, the application of this test
is straightforward. All transactions which occur within the London
Stock Exchange, for example, regardless of the nationality of the par-
ticipants should be considered under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Great Britain. For transactions that take place off-exchange, a more
factor driven connection test may be necessary, taking into account
the nationality of the parties and the location of their communications
and payments. Any residual ambiguity will be mitigated to the extent
such parties may simply choose to enter into exchange or market sys-
tem based transactions to place themselves unambiguously under the
rules of one particular jurisdiction.
83 See, e.g., Maguire, supra note 58, at 960 n.86 (citing Meridith B. Brown & Simon Mac-
Lachlan, Legal Headaches for Buyers going into Foreign Lands, INT'I MERGERS & AcotusI-
TIONs 57,60 (Mar./Apr. 1991)); Edward F. Greene, Regulation of Multinational Tender Offers, 4
INsIGTrr 25, 27 (1990); Douglas B. Spoors, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of Securities
Regulation, Territorialism in the Wake of the October 1987 Market Crash, 1 TRA4NSNAT'L LAW.
307, 337 (1988); Deborah A. Demott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65




C. Other Alternatives to Extraterritoriality
Of course the connection test is not the only means of achieving
capital mobility. Two more radical approaches are presented below.
1. Portable Reciprocity
Reciprocity agreements typically provide that foreign issuers may
both list their stocks in domestic exchanges as well as raise capital
within the domestic market so long as they comply with securities laws
in their home country. The multi-jurisdictional disclosure agreement
with Canada, for example, allows certain Canadian issuers to make
offerings in the United States while complying only with the regula-
tory provisions of Canada 4 Reciprocity agreements, therefore, leave
it up to the individual company whether to be governed by the host
country's or its own country's laws. 5
This Article argues that regulators may wish to go one step fur-
ther than mere reciprocity to what we term "portable reciprocity."
Portable reciprocity embodies the notion that issuers may follow the
law of a country other than the country where the securities are actu-
ally being traded. Thus, investors gain the benefit of choosing among
different securities regimes while saving on transaction costs. Rather
than having to deal with investing money abroad, for example, inves-
tors may simply look to companies on their own domestic exchanges
to obtain the benefit of another regime's securities protection. 6 Port-
able reciprocity, however, adds one additional element to reciprocity.
Rather than requiring that companies adhere to the regime of their
home country, companies would be allowed to select the regime of
84 See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current Registration and Re-
porting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, Exchange Act Release
No. 29,354, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036, 30,036 (July 1, 1991).
85 See Edward F. Greene, Daniel A. Braverman, and Sebastian R. Sperber, Hegemony or
Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413,
433-38 (1995) (arguing for greater deference within the United States to the home-country dis-
closure provisions of foreign issuers meeting certain size and market following requirements so
long as the disclosure provisions function in a manner comparable to U.S. regulations). Related
to reciprocity are proposals to allow certain well followed foreign companies to issue in the
United States under Section 5 while complying only with their own-country financial accounting
standards. See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements For Foreign Firms Appro-
priate?, 17 FoRDsmM Ir'L L.J. 58, 63 (1994) (summarizing a NYSE proposal to allow "world-
class" foreign companies to issue without compliance to GAAP so long as a written explanation
describing material differences in accounting practices is supplied).
86 Investors may face considerable transaction costs investing in securities abroad. See e.g.,
Demmo, supra note 19, at 713 (detailing the higher brokerage fees, higher bid-ask spreads and
higher clearance, settlement, and custody costs investors must pay to purchase securities
abroad).
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any country of their choosing. Such a system would add increased
issuer mobility in addition to investor mobility. To the extent an is-
suer disliked the regulations of a particular regime, they could simply
choose another country's regime. Under a regime of portable reci-
procity, so long as the issuer notified all countries of this choice, its
securities would be governed by the laws of the selected country.
Portable reciprocity, moreover, would solve the problems embod-
ied in extraterritoriality. Under portable reciprocity, all the securities
of a company would be governed by one consistent law. Essentially,
reciprocity eliminates the notion of geographic or territorial applica-
tion of laws. Rather, the issuers and investors themselves choose
which laws should govern in which markets. Through such mobility,
issuers and investors would apply pressure on countries to tailor regu-
lations in the joint interests of issuers and investors. Under a world-
wide system of portable reciprocity, countries gain to the extent more
parties elect to be governed under their regimes. Greater numbers of
filing parties, for example, would increase the filing fees within those
countries; furthermore, to the extent a tendency exists for issuers and
investors to conduct securities transactions within the markets of
countries under whose regime they are regulated, countries will gain
through increased securities volume. Such a tendency may exist, for
example, because a country's securities regulatory regime may more
closely monitor securities located within the country's geographic
borders.
Some, including former SEC chairman Richard C. Breeden, criti-
cize reciprocity. Breeden argued that reciprocity places domestic
companies at a potential competitive disadvantage relative to foreign
issuers seeking to raise capital and that such agreements increase in-
vestor confusion and reduce the ability of investors to compare differ-
ent issuers.87 Portable reciprocity eliminates any disadvantage faced
by American firms because they could choose, if they wish, a less de-
manding regime. With respect to Breeden's second concern - investor
confusion - portable reciprocity is problematic. Investors, however,
already face a large choice of investments across foreign markets, each
with a different securities regime. Providing foreign companies and
their accompanying foreign regulatory regimes with easier access to
87 See Breeden, supra note 2, at 90 (stating "if the SEC were to adopt a system of home
country exemptions, then U.S. investors would be confronted even today with financial state-
ments prepared under at least forty different sets of accounting principles. That approach actu-





the United States simply reduces the transaction cost for domestic in-
vestors to actually purchase foreign securities. United States investors
already may invest directly in German companies within the German
capital market system, for example. However, taxes and an unfamili-
arity with the German capital markets may hinder this mobility. Reci-
procity simply reduces this transaction cost and thereby increases
investor mobility. Moreover, to the extent U.S. regulations are in fact
superior and therefore result in investors willing to pay a higher price,
foreign companies will voluntarily elect to comply with U.S. securities
laws. 8
Furthermore, reciprocity may not result in a myriad of different
regimes all trading in the same country and marketplace. Some regu-
latory regimes are better suited for particular markets. Certain ex-
changes, for example, already possess strong, market-based antifraud
mechanisms and, therefore, may require less stringent antifraud legal
regimes. Moreover, there will exist a natural tendency for issuers and
investors to comply with the regimes of their home countries. These
regimes are more familiar to such parties and require the least amount
of resources to understand and apply. Finally, to the extent certain
regimes maximize the joint welfare of certain subgroups of issuers and
investors, these regimes will form focal points and become prevalent
world-wide.
2. International Company Registration
Another alternative to today's regulatory regime would involve a
complete shift in the method of regulation. Currently, the Securities
Act takes a transaction based approach to regulation. Section 5's re-
quirements focus on each individual offer or sale of a security. Simi-
larly, Regulation S exempts specific transactions from Section 5's
reach. From the point of view of investor protection and the integrity
of the capital markets, however, what matters is not the information
delivered during any particular transaction, but rather the information
available to investors about the company. For example, Regulation S
makes a distinction between foreign companies that issue debt or eq-
uity securities. However, what really is important is not the exact se-
curity involved in the transaction but how much readily available
information exists.
88 Reciprocity also may lead to problems of enforcement. To the extent a U.S. company
issues securities fraudulently under U.S. laws in Germany, for example, German investors would
have to file suit in U.S. courts to obtain civil judgment.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:207 (1996)
A possible reform, therefore, would be to register companies
rather than transactions.8 9 Switching to a company based registration
system rationalizes the approach to securities regulation by more com-
pletely taking into account the needs of investors. To the extent inves-
tors trade the securities of well followed companies - for example,
companies trading in an efficient market with adequately disclosed
company information 9° - these investors are protected in all transac-
tions in the companies' securities. In contrast, where little market in-
formation exists on the companies' securities, investors are at risk in
all transactions of the companies' securities. Given the importance of
the companies' status to investors, moving to a regulatory system that
focuses more on this status may result in better investor protection.
A company based registration system would also provide inves-
tors and issuers the benefits of both a clear choice of regimes and a
relatively inexpensive means of exercising this choice. Under the
company based registration system, any company - foreign or domes-
tic - that registered as a company within the United States would be
subject to American laws. Companies that failed to register, in con-
trast, would be forbidden from having their shares ever traded in the
United States. For both issuers and investors, therefore, the choice of
whether American laws apply would be clear. Furthermore, investors
would bear no extra burden when investing in the securities of compa-
nies not registered in the United States. They could engage in all the
preparatory work they desired in the United States. The consumma-
tion of the transaction, however, would have to occur outside the
United States.
89 Recently, the SEC initiated an investigation into the possibility of shifting toward a com-
pany-registration system. The Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes to the SEC produced a report this past July advocating a movement toward a more
formal company registration system in the United States. See Advisory Comm. on the Capital
Formation and Regulatory Processes, SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital
Formation and Regulatory Processes (July 24, 1996). See also Stephen J. Choi, Company Regis-
tratiorn Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Cm. L. Rv. (forthcoming Spring
1997)(arguing that many substantive aspects of company registration already exist within the
current securities regime).
90 In a semi-strong efficient market, all publicly traded information is incorporated through
market pressure into the secondary market price. See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraak-
man, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Rv. 549, 569-72 (1984). For the pur-





D. The Multiple Listing Problem
In determining the proper role for extraterritoriality, one addi-
tional problem exists: the multiple listing of securities by the same
company across several jurisdictions. This section (1) discusses the
problem; (2) analyzes jurisdictional rules which avoid the problem;
and (3) concludes that the multiple listing problem, in any case,
presents no major hurdles to extraterritoriality reform.
1. Multiple Listings
Under the current extraterritoriality regime, companies - at least
from the United States - may issue multiple "batches" of securities
and list them across several different jurisdictions. Each batch, in
turn, may face a different regulatory regime depending on the jurisdic-
tional rule of each country. For example, under a strict rule of territo-
riality, as embodied within the proposed connection test described
above, even securities of the same class issued in different countries
could very well face different disclosure and antifraud provisions.
Multiple listing, therefore, presents regulators with at least two dis-
tinct problems.
Companies, first of all, may choose not to raise capital in different
jurisdictions in order to avoid the duplicative cost of complying with
several different regimes.9' Strong business reasons may exist, how-
ever, to raise capital in more than one country. Where no individual
market contains enough capital or liquidity to satisfy a company's cap-
ital needs, companies may choose to list in more than one market.
Having securities listed in a particular country may also raise the con-
sciousness of residents in the country to the company's products. Fur-
thermore, building a base of domestic shareholders increases a
company's clout with domestic politicians. On a more cynical note,
managers may seek multiple listings to spread their shareholders
across countries as a means to raise the cost of coordinated share-
holder action. To the extent the added expense of complying with the
securities regimes of multiple countries deters multiple listing, there-
fore, society may lose as the cost of capital to companies rises and
companies find it more difficult to compete on an international scale.
Second, through flowback, securities issued in one country under
a different set of regulatory rules may make their way back to another
91 See also Lisa K. Bostwick, The SEC Response to Internationalization and Institutionaliza-
tion: Rule 144A Merit Regulation of Investors, 27 LAw & Por2Y INr'L Bus. 423, 438 (1996)
(noting that different regulatory standards in different jurisdictions results in additional delay
and compliance costs of multinational issuers).
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country with a different set of rules. Flowback, therefore, provides
transacting parties a potential means of arbitraging away unwanted
securities regulations of one country while physically staying within
the capital markets of that country. For example, company 1, located
in country A, may issue securities within country B under B's rela-
tively lax antifraud and disclosure laws. Investors may then resell
these securities back into country A without either additional disclo-
sures from company 1 or antifraud liability on company 1. Collapsing
these transactions, company I has, in effect, issued securities in coun-
try A without following country A's regulatory requirements. 92
As the next section discusses, extraterritoriality provides one, but
by no means the only, means of combating the multiple listing
problem.
2. Avoiding Multiple Listing Problems
For now assume that multiple listing is, in fact, a problem. Extra-
territoriality provides only a partial solution. Under the United
States' transaction oriented system, extraterritoriality works to reach
issuer driven transactions that occur outside the United States. On its
face, this approach alleviates some of the multiple listing problem. To
the extent that extraterritoriality causes the same disclosure and an-
tifraud rules to apply to transactions occurring in multiple jurisdic-
tions, the problem of flowback is alleviated. Again assume company 1
issues securities in countries A and B. With a rule of extraterritorial-
ity, country A need not worry that shares issued in country B may
enter country A without having been issued with the antifraud and
disclosure rules of country A.
Note, however, the extraterritoriality does not eliminate all of the
problems of multiple listing. Specifically, should one country apply its
laws extraterritorially, this does not ensure consistent treatment of all
securities of the same issuer. Other countries, for example, that also
have an interest in at least some of company's securities may choose
to apply their laws. Country B, for instance, may enforce its own, dif-
ferent set of disclosure rules on shares issued within country B.
Shares issued in country A, therefore, would face only the regulations
of country A; whereas shares issued in country B would face the regu-
92 See Josh Futterman, Note, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening
U.S. Investor Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L
L.J. 806, 852-53 (noting that flowback is a serious problem in the United States and proposing





lations of both country A and B. Companies, as a result, may still face
the burden of having to comply with multiple regimes.93
A better solution exists. Employing either of the two alternatives
in Part III. C. would both alleviate the multiple listing problem more
completely than a broad extraterritorial rule, while also providing for
increased capital mobility. First, employing a portable reciprocity no-
tion of jurisdiction would provide each issuer with a consistent regula-
tory regime. To the extent all other countries recognized and applied
the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the issuer's country-of-
choice, the issuer avoids the problem of multiple disclosure and an-
tifraud requirements and the associated additional expense. Further-
more, a rule of portable reciprocity would provide consistent
treatment for all the securities of the issuer, eliminating the problem
of flowback. As discussed above, portable reciprocity also encourages
capital mobility by reducing the cost to investors of selecting issuers
under different regimes while providing issuers an inexpensive means
of selecting a regime.
Second, a company registration system would also reduce the
multiple listing problem. Under company registration, flowback
problems are eliminated. If the company is registered in the United
States, for example, securities issued worldwide would be tradeable in
the United States without additional disclosures. Conversely, where
the company is not registered in the United States, securities would be
banned from entering the United States. Because only securities
where enough information exists may be traded, U.S. investors are
protected where flowback occurs. Note, however, that company regis-
tration may still result in different batches of securities facing various
regulatory requirements around the world; problems of multiple juris-
dictional costs, therefore, may still exist. As the next section discusses,
however, the magnitude of this expense may be overstated.
3. The Non-Problem of Multiple Listing
Even without reforms to institute portable reciprocity or com-
pany registration, the multiple listing problem may be more illusory
than real for both flowback securities and the cost to issuers of com-
plying with several securities regimes.
Flowback is really only a problem for companies without an ac-
tive investment following in the United States. Take, for example, Ex-
change Act reporting companies. For such companies - particularly to
93 Furthermore, because the securities in the two countries face different overall levels of
disclosure and liability, their securities prices may differ.
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the extent large, institutional investors follow the companies in an effi-
cient market - the capital markets in the United States already possess
a large amount of information on the companies, which is reflected in
the secondary market prices. Flowback, therefore, will not necessarily
result in any harm to American investors. So long as the secondary
market price incorporates the publicly available information on the
company, investors are protected.
Now consider non-Exchange Act reporting companies. Such
small, low capitalized companies typically are not followed by many, if
any, investment analysts. Their stocks, as well, are often illiquid,
rarely trading more than once a day. Non-Exchange Act reporting
companies, moreover, may not release any public information on their
operations, finances, or business plans. 4 To the extent flowback oc-
curs for such companies' securities, therefore, investors in the United
States may be at risk. However, for two reasons, this risk is relatively
minor. First, although such companies may lack disclosure in the
United States, they may have made disclosures to meet the securities
regime of other countries in which they issued securities. American
investors, therefore, may turn to these alternative sources of informa-
tion to judge the investment merits of flowback securities. Note, how-
ever, that such information is not a perfect substitute for U.S.
disclosure. Often the information will not consist of the same quality
or type of disclosure, the information may also be in a foreign lan-
guage, and the foreign disclosures may not be readily accessible within
the United States.
Second, despite the fact that the SEC finds flowback transactions
troubling, there is little reason for the United States to discourage
them. As long as investors are aware of the legal regime that they are
"purchasing" along with the shares, they are not defrauded in any
way. Even where no information exists with respect to the flowback
securities, investors in the United States may still protect themselves
through discounts to the securities' price. No one forces U.S. inves-
tors to purchase the flowback securities. Those who do so presumably
understand the risks involved. Where such risks are understood, ra-
tional investors will price down the securities to take these risks into
account. Furthermore, companies, to avoid such a price down, may
voluntarily choose to comply with U.S. registration requirements.
Moreover, although the expense of complying with multiple juris-
dictions is a real cost, the magnitude of this expense is overstated for
94 See Toddi Gutner, How to Keep the Little Guy in the Loop, Bus. WK., July 29, 1996, at 32.
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several reasons. First, in response to the need to reduce the cost of
capital for companies, countries possess a natural incentive to coordi-
nate their regimes. Companies, in turn, may find that issuing securi-
ties within the markets of these coordinating countries provides them
with enough capital and liquidity at an acceptable cost. Canada and
the United States, for example, in recent years brought their own se-
curities systems in line with one another. Second, even given a range
of different regimes, companies may find that business reasons lead
them to countries that also happen to have similar securities regimes.
This may occur, for example, because countries with similar business
infrastructures and markets possess similar securities regimes.
In summary, the ability of companies to engage in multiple list-
ings provides an additional level of complexity in thinking about the
ideal system of extraterritoriality. However, the problems associated
with multiple listing are often overstated and, in any case, are not best
solved through extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. securities regime presides over a thriving and successful
capital market. Instituted during the 1930s, the major portions of this
regime are found in the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Together
the two Acts regulate almost all securities offerings and secondary
market transactions. For several decades after the 1930s, the current
system proved robust. Most Americans transacted in securities of
U.S. companies; similarly, most U.S. companies sought to raise capital
solely in the United States. Today, however, the rapid expansion of
the global marketplace has changed the U.S. capital markets dramati-
cally. The increasing volume of international transactions has placed
strains on the current system of extraterritoriality. Some transactions
are initiated in the United States but are consummated abroad; other
transactions involve parties from two different countries; still other
transactions take place as part of a company's effort to raise capital in
multiple countries. The challenge to the U.S. securities system today
is how to effectively and rationally take into account the pressure of
international capital markets.
In response, this Article presents a critical analysis of extraterri-
toriality. Current extraterritoriality doctrine extends U.S. jurisdiction
to foreign securities transactions under a number of different ratio-
nales. Through tests based on conduct or effect, jurisdiction often is
applied in the name of protecting U.S. investors or the integrity of
U.S. markets. Extraterritoriality is also used to combat problems aris-
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ing from companies engaging in multiple listings of securities across
several different jurisdictions. This Article, however, argues that the
current doctrine around extraterritoriality is both unnecessary and
outdated.
Instead, this Article argues that investors and issuers as a group
are best protected through increased capital mobility. Investors that
dislike a particular country's regime may vote with their feet and
switch to another country's markets. Issuers that desire a different set
of regulations, similarly, may also issue their securities elsewhere.
Where both investors and issuers have such mobility, countries will
compete to provide the regime which maximizes the wealth of inves-
tors and issuers jointly. More than any one country's extraterritorial
application of laws, therefore, issuers and investors are best protected
through jurisdictional rules which give parties an ability ex ante to opt
clearly for a particular regime without much transaction cost.
Securities regulation in the United States and elsewhere is pre-
mised on certain assumptions about the ability of investors to select
investments. The SEC, for example, does not screen directly for bad
investments; rather, the SEC only ensures that deceptive practices are
prevented and that the information on the market is as accurate as
possible. This is a suitable role for the government only if we assume
that investors both receive adequate investment information and ra-
tionally consider this information when making decisions. Further-
more, it is assumed that investors are aware of their legal rights when
they invest. In other words, the underlying assumption behind the
current domestic securities regime is that individuals are able to con-
sider the risks and returns offered by a security in light of the informa-
tion available and the regulatory regime in place and that the investor
is able to identify and pursue his own interests based on that
information.
The proposals of this paper require no stronger assumptions
about the behavior of investors than does the current regulatory struc-
ture of the domestic market. Admittedly, regulations would have to
be installed to ensure that buyers are put on notice when they invest
in foreign securities, but beyond this protection, investors must accept
the risk of their investments.
This Article, therefore, argues for jurisdictional rules which en-
hance the ability of issuers and investors to choose among different
countries' securities regimes. Three such rules are presented here.
First, countries may employ strict rules of territorial jurisdiction based




country. Where a transaction takes place on the NYSE, for example,
the law of the United States should apply. This is the rule we advo-
cate. Second, countries may consider adopting a rule of portable reci-
procity to providing investors and issuers the maximum amount of
mobility. Finally, a shift within the United States toward a company
based registration system would remove many of the ambiguities and
complexities surrounding overseas transactions while rationalizing
protection for U.S. investors.
